From: DAVID CHEIFETZ <davidcheifetz@rogers.com>
To: obligations@uwo.ca
Date: 19/12/2009 14:20:15 UTC
Subject: Insurance policy and contract interpretation: meaning of accident

Dear Colleagues,
 
The Supreme Court of Canada has been kind enough to provide Canadian lawyers, and others, with a gift for the Holiday season: Co-operators Life Insurance Co. v. Gibbens, 2009 SCC 59, available at
 
http://csc.lexum.umontreal.ca/en/2009/2009scc59/2009scc59.html
 
The issue in the case is the meaning of accident in an accident policy. The Court made the explicit point that "accident insurance is not comprehensive health insurance". [para. 2]
 
Quoting from the headnote:
 
Insurance — Accident insurance — Accident and Disease benefit — Insured person becoming paralyzed below his mid\u8209 -abdomen after acquiring genital herpes by engaging in unprotected sexual intercourse — Whether insured’s paralysis caused by “external, violent and accidental means” within meaning of insurance policy.
 
The insured had unprotected sex with three women and acquired genital herpes, which in turn caused transverse myelitis, a rare complication of herpes that resulted in total paralysis from his mid\u8209 -abdomen down.  He was aware of the risk of contracting a sexually transmitted disease but did not know that any of the women had genital herpes.  He claimed compensation under his group insurance policy which provided coverage for losses sustained “as a direct result of a Critical Disease or resulting directly and independently of all other causes from bodily Injuries occasioned solely through external, violent and accidental means, without negligence” on the insured’s part.  The definition of (critical) diseases in the policy does not include transverse myelitis.  The insured commenced an action and the parties applied to the British Columbia Supreme Court for a determination of whether his paraplegia qualifies as a “bodily injur[y] occasioned solely through external, violent and accidental means”.  The trial judge answered the question in the affirmative and awarded the insured $200,000.  The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge’s decision.
 
Held:  The appeal should be allowed.
 
The insured’s loss is not covered by the policy.  The interpretation of insurance policies should avoid unrealistic results that would not have been contemplated by the insured and the insurer when they entered into the policy agreement.  The word “accident” is an ordinary word to be interpreted in ordinary language as it would be understood by the average person applying for insurance.  That said, the definition of accident has proven, in practice, to be one of the more philosophically complex simple questions
 
Justice Binnie, writing for the unanimous, full court, produced cogent, elegant, and insightful reasons.  (I didn't write "remarkable" because the triplet is buttering-up enough and, besides, "remarkable" is one of those remarkable words whose meaning may be remarkably ambiguous.)The reasons contain a number of sentences and phrases that we are likely to see in Canadian reasons for judgment for the foreseeable future and, as Russ Brown has already noted, the analysis "is potentially important for other areas of law, such as the standard of care." I'd add causation (but that probably didn't surprise some of you.)
 
Justice Binnie began his analysis with this:
 
[16] A century and a half of insurance litigation has failed to produce a bright line definition of the word “accident”.  Insurers have consistently declined to attempt to define the term in their policies.  It has been left to the courts to interpret it, and the courts have found the analysis to pose, as an American court put it, “one of the more philosophically complex simple questions”: Fegan v. State Mutual Life Assurance Co. of America, 945 F. Supp. 396 (D. N.H. 1996), at p. 399.
 
Justice Binnie was also kind enough to introduce, for those of us who care about such things, a new type of metaphysics to be avoided, at least by practitioner-lawyers and judges: "law office metaphysics". "The courts do not favour the self-serving isolation of a particular element in a chain of events that should be considered in its entirety.  Such law office metaphysics would make nonsense of the reasonable expectation of the parties at the time the policy was entered into." [para. 57].
 
Best wishes to all for the holiday season.
 
David Cheifetz